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Abstract
The Australian Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding was developed
in 2008 shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers. It was designed to foster financialsystem stability and confidence and to help depository institutions continue to access
funding during a period of volatility. In addition to a guarantee for large deposits, the scheme
allowed institutions to apply for a government guarantee for newly issued wholesale
liabilities with maturities of up to five years; in return, the institutions paid the government
a monthly fee based on their credit rating and the value of the debt guaranteed. The entire
Guarantee Scheme became operational in November 2008 and closed to new issuance in
March
2010,
by
which
time
16
institutions
had
issued
about
A$166 billion ($108.7 billion) of guaranteed securities. The Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale
funding component formally ended in October 2015, a few months after the final guaranteed
instrument matured. It incurred no losses, no claims were made against it, and it earned
A$4.5 billion ($2.95 billion) in fees for the support provided.
Keywords: wholesale funding, government guarantee, ADIs, guaranteed instruments,
Australia

_____________________________________________________________________
This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to credit guarantee programs.
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Australian Government Guarantee Scheme
for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding
At a Glance
In October 2008, the adverse effects of the burgeoning global financial crisis were limiting
the ability of Australian depository
institutions to access global long-term Summary of Key Terms
wholesale markets, “and what funding
occurred was at spreads that were Purpose: Promote financial system stability by
significantly wider than normal,” according supporting confidence and assisting institutions in
to a later analysis by Australian central accessing funding during a period of extreme market
stress
bank officials (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
Announcement Date
October 12, 2008
On October 12, 2008, the Australian
November 28, 2008
government announced the creation of a Operational Date
Date
of
First
Guaranteed
November 28, 2008
scheme
that
included
guarantee
Loan
Issuance
arrangements for depository institution
Closed to new issuances
funding: the Australian Guarantee Scheme Issuance Window
March 31, 2010
for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding. Expiration Date
It became operational on November 28, Program Size
No explicit cap
2008. Eligible institutions could access a Usage
A$166 billion AUD
government guarantee for their wholesale
($108.7 billion)
liabilities with maturities of up to five years Outcomes
No defaults; A$4.5 billion
(less in the case of foreign bank branches).
($3.0 billion) in fees
In exchange for the government guarantee,
generated
institutions paid the government a monthly
Open-ended issuance
fee based on their credit rating and the Notable Features
window and no cap on
value of the debt guaranteed (Reserve Bank
program size or
of Australia 2013; Schwartz 2010;
institutions’ participation
Schwartz and Tan 2016).
As similar schemes were simultaneously being implemented worldwide, the Guarantee
Scheme was designed as a response to ensure that Australian institutions remained on equal
footing with other institutions that had access to similar programs (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
The Guarantee Scheme was designed to support confidence in institutions and “ensure that
an otherwise sound institution would not experience financial distress due to a shortage of
funding.”
The Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component closed to new issuance on March 31,
2010, by which time beneficiaries had issued approximately A$166 billion ($108.7 billion)
of guaranteed securities, the majority of which was long-term wholesale funding. The final
guaranteed security matured in March 2015, and the scheme formally closed on October 24,
2015 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013, Schwartz 2010). It incurred no losses and earned
A$4.5 billion ($3.0 billion) in fees in return for the support provided (Schwartz and Tan
2016).
Summary Evaluation
The Guarantee Scheme is seen as successful, given that it allowed institutions to continue to
access funding markets and effectively supported the Australian financial system and
economy through the crisis.

577

Australian Government Guarantee Scheme

Smith

Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding: Australia Context
$948.6 billion in 2007
GDP
$1,050.1 billion in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
Source: Bloomberg
$40,960 in 2007
$49,602 in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Sovereign credit rating (5year senior debt)

As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Size of banking system

Size of banking system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking system as a
percentage of financial
system

5-bank concentration of
banking system

Foreign involvement in
banking system

Source: Bloomberg
$1,042.2 billion in total assets in 2007
$1,224.1 billion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
109.9% in 2007
116.7% in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
Banking system assets equal to 90% of financial
system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 91% of financial
system in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
83.6% of total banking assets in 2007
85.9% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
7% of total banking assets in 2007
5% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
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banking system

Existence of deposit
insurance
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0% of banks owned by the state in 2007
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and Supervision
Survey
0% insurance on deposits up to $0 (depositor
preference system) in 2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $704,225.35 by the
end of 2008 (temporary measure due to the policy
detailed in this document)
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset
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I. Overview
Background
One of the international effects of the global financial crisis was a dearth of liquidity at the
end of 2008 and an enormous perceived risk for large banks. As a result, “international longterm wholesale funding markets essentially closed to non-sovereign borrowers,” according
to Australian authorities (Schwartz 2010). Australia’s banking system was robust at the time
of the global financial crisis; however, as institutions experienced restricted access to
funding, especially in international long-term wholesale funding markets, investors became
reluctant to buy long-term bank debt, and the lack of access had “potentially serious
implications for liquidity and lending activity” (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012; Schwartz
2010).
It was against this backdrop and coupled with similar announcements in a number of other
countries that the Australian government created the Government Guarantee Scheme for
Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding as part of its other measures created in response to
the global financial crisis (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013).
Program Description
The Australian Government Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding,
also known as the Guarantee Scheme, was announced by the government on October 12,
2008, and began on November 28, 2008 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). It was
administered by the Reserve Bank of Australia on behalf of the Australian government
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2013). The government announced that the Guarantee Scheme
would remain open until markets normalized, rather than establishing a set expiration date
(Schwartz 2010). This case will deal only with the wholesale funding component of the
scheme.3
The wholesale funding component of the Guarantee Scheme allowed Australian depository
institutions (known in Australia as authorized deposit-taking institutions, or ADIs) to issue
securities with maturities of up to five years (less in the case of foreign bank branches)4 that
were fully guaranteed by the Australian government (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013;
Schwartz 2010). The government did not establish minimum maturity requirements for
eligible debt or place a limit on the total value of liabilities it would cover (Schwartz and Tan
2016).
There were two processes for institutions issuing securities based on maturity: one for
short-term liabilities (with maturities of less than 15 months)5 and the second for long-term
liabilities (with maturities of 15 to 60 months)6 (Australian Government 2012). Institutions
eligible for the scheme included banks, building societies, and credit unions. To apply for the
_____________________________________________________________________
The Guarantee Scheme had two components: a wholesale funding guarantee and a deposit guarantee. The
deposit guarantee covered deposits up to A$1 million at no cost and amounts above that for a fee. It was
replaced in 2012 with a cap of A$250,000 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012).
4 Foreign branches had restricted access to the Guarantee Scheme (Schwartz 2010).
5 For specific information on this process, refer to the Guarantee Scheme Rules (Australian Government 2012).
6 Australian Government 2012.
3
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scheme, an institution had to complete an eligibility certificate provided by the Reserve Bank
of Australia (acting as the program’s “scheme administrator”). Further, after an institution
had been approved for a guarantee, it had to provide a separate certificate for each type of
liability (Schwartz 2010).
Eligible short-term liabilities took the form of senior unsecured debt instruments in any
currency with maturities of less than 15 months. The instruments could be issued in bearer,
registered, or dematerialized form. They could not be complex and had to fall in the
categories of bank bills, certificates of deposit/transferable deposits, debentures, or
commercial paper, and applications could be made for issuance programs (Australian
Government 2012).
Eligible long-term liabilities took the form of senior unsecured debt instruments in any
currency with maturities of 15 to 60 months. The instruments could be issued in bearer,
registered or dematerialized form. They could not be complex and had to fall in the
categories of bonds, notes, or debentures, and applications could be made for issuance
programs (Australian Government 2012).
All guaranteed liabilities were subject to a monthly fee for eligible debt issued on or after
November 28, 2008. The issuing institution was required to pay this fee within seven
business days of the last calendar day of each month in arrears (Australian Government
2012; Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). The amount of the fee depended on both the credit
rating of the institution (lower-rated institutions had to pay a higher fee to access the
guarantee) and the value of the guaranteed liabilities. The same fee applied regardless of the
term of the debt (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012). The fee ranged from 70 to 150 basis
points (bps) per annum depending on the credit rating of the institution.7
Last, “all Australian institutions were required to have systems in place to identify separately
guaranteed liabilities and other liabilities. For wholesale liabilities, systems had to be in place
before the guaranteed liabilities were issued” (Australian Government 2012).
There were several safeguards built into the Guarantee Scheme. Any institution seeking
involvement had to have approval from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA), Australia’s bank regulator. Foreign bank branches, which were subject to less
Australian supervisory oversight, had multiple additional restrictions for participation,
including shorter maturity limits and caps on the amount that could be issued. Last, the
Council of Financial Regulators, an agency that served in an advisory capacity during the
Guarantee Scheme’s creation and operation, required monitoring of exposures and regular
reports on both individual bank exposures and foreign branch activities (Schwartz and Tan
2016).
Outcomes
The Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component had an immediate effect on
Australian institutions. They had only issued bonds worth A$2 billion ($1.31 billion)8 in the
three months before the Guarantee Scheme’s introduction, but in the program’s first three
months, they issued A$73 billion of bonds, of which A$70 billion was guaranteed through the
program (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
_____________________________________________________________________
For short-term liabilities only, the following applied: in calculating the value of these liabilities, the gross
proceeds of the fund raising were to be used (Australian Government 2012).
8 The monthly average spot rate in November 2008 was $1 = A$1.5266.
7
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The Guarantee Scheme’s peak use came during its initial period of operation, “when risk
aversion among investors was highest” (Schwartz and Tan 2016, Schwartz 2010).
As markets began to reopen, use of the Guarantee Scheme eased (see Figure 1). In late 2008,
guaranteed bonds represented 100 percent of total bond issuance; by late 2009, they only
represented about 30 percent. Guaranteed short-term wholesale funding peaked in
February 2009 at A$22.4 billion, but quickly fell to around A$17.1 billion by January of the
next year (Schwartz 2010; Schwartz and Tan 2016).
Australia’s four main banks—Commonwealth Bank, Westpac Banking Corporation, National
Australia Bank, and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group—represented the Guarantee
Scheme’s largest users, accounting for about two-thirds of total guaranteed issuance.
However, issuance as a share of liabilities was higher among non-major Australian banks.
Before the crisis, these non-major banks chose not to issue many bonds and instead operated
in residential mortgage-backed securities markets. When the crisis made these markets
unpalatable, the non-major banks responded by making significant use of the Guarantee
Scheme and issuing large amounts of guaranteed bonds (Schwartz and Tan 2016). This
pattern can be seen in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Guarantee Scheme Usage

Source: Schwartz and Tan 2016.

582

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

Figure 2: Bank-Issued Government-Guaranteed Debt, March 2010

Source: Schwartz and Tan 2016.
Institutions predominantly used the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component for
long-term liabilities. The majority of short-term debt issuance came from non-major
institutions, which is partly explained by the fact that, as part of the Guarantee Scheme’s slew
of safeguards, foreign-owned branches were not allowed to issue guaranteed debt with
maturities of greater than 15 months (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
By June 2009, as global markets became healthier, banks began issuing unguaranteed bonds.
Issuance of guaranteed bonds, which had accounted for almost all bond issuance following
the Guarantee Scheme’s implementation, fell to close to zero in early 2010. “This reflected
that the sharp compression in bank bond spreads over 2009 was more pronounced for
unguaranteed bonds than for guaranteed bonds, particularly for higher-rated issuers. As a
result, it was generally advantageous for the double-A-rated banks to issue unguaranteed
rather than issuing guaranteed and incurring the associated fee” (Schwartz 2010).
On February 7, 2010, the government announced that the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale
funding component would close to new issuance on March 31, 2010. Any institution that
wished to apply for the program had until March 24, 2010, to do so, and institutions could
issue guaranteed liabilities up to and including March 31, 2010. After March 31, any liabilities
already covered under the Guarantee Scheme “would remain guaranteed until either they
matured or were bought back and extinguished by the issuer,” and institutions were
required to keep paying monthly fees on these guaranteed liabilities (Schwartz 2010,
Schwartz and Tan 2016).
By the time the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component closed to new issuance
on March 31, the beneficiaries had issued about A$166 billion of guaranteed liabilities. At
that time, the amount of guaranteed wholesale funding represented about 15 percent of all
wholesale liabilities. Ultimately, the monthly fees generated by the Guarantee Scheme
totaled A$4.5 billion in government revenue (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013, Schwartz
2010, Schwartz and Tan 2016).
After the closure of the Guarantee Scheme, previously issued guaranteed bonds matured and
the amount of guaranteed bonds began to fall. This fall in supply was compounded by
buybacks: as the markets improved, and the maturity profiles of the remaining guaranteed
debt shortened (approximately 12 and 18 months remaining to maturity), the cost of
maintaining government-guaranteed debt became more expensive than issuing
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unguaranteed debt. Thus, institutions began repurchasing their debt, at first in small
amounts, but increasing as conditions improved9 (Schwartz 2010, Schwartz and Tan 2016).
Institutions repurchased about A$16 billion of guaranteed bonds by mid-2012. Some of the
biggest issuers of guaranteed bonds began large-scale repurchases in late 2012 and early
2013, during which time they bought back about A$15 billion of guaranteed bonds. These
buybacks contributed to a decline in the supply of guaranteed bonds to about A$57 billion,
as seen in Figure 3 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013).
Figure 3: Australian Government-Guaranteed Debt

Source: Reserve Bank of Australia 2013.
Non-major institutions bought back a larger share of their guaranteed debt than did major
institutions, even though major institutions accounted for more than half of total buybacks
in absolute terms. While major institutions bought back A$33 billion (about 33 percent of
their issuance under the Guarantee Scheme), non-major institutions bought back about A$25
billion of guaranteed debt, which represented slightly more than 50 percent of their issuance
(Schwartz 2010, Schwartz and Tan 2016).
The scheme’s final bond matured in early 2015, and the scheme formally ended in October
2015 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The Guarantee Scheme represented one piece in a comprehensive response to the
global financial crisis.
_____________________________________________________________________
The first buyback of guaranteed debt occurred early in mid-2009, but buyback activity was not prominent
until 2011 (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
9
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This included a cut in interest rates and multiple stimulus packages (Kennedy 2009).
2. The Guarantee Scheme derived its legal authority from the Financial Claims
Scheme.
This authority allowed for the establishment of the Guarantee Scheme without the need for
additional legislation.
3. There was no cap on the program’s size.
Australian authorities intended the lack of a cap to demonstrate their commitment to offer
as much support as necessary to the banking system.
4. Only authorized deposit-taking institutions were eligible to have their liabilities
guaranteed by the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component.
The Reserve Bank of Australia supplied a list of eligible institutions, and these included:
Australian-owned banks; Australian-incorporated institutions that were subsidiaries of
foreign banks; branches of foreign banks; building societies; credit unions; and a small
category for four “other” institutions. For a complete list of eligible institutions by name, see
“Eligible Institutions” in Key Program Documents.
Any institution seeking involvement in the scheme had to have approval from the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority.
Foreign bank branches, “which were subject to less Australian supervisory oversight,” had
multiple additional restrictions for participation. The liabilities guaranteed by foreign
branches had shorter maturity limits (initially set until December 31, 2009, and later
extended to a rolling 15-month maturity); “total guaranteed liabilities could not exceed 110
percent of the average daily value of short-term liabilities and deposits in the 30 days prior
to the announcement of the scheme; and their guaranteed liabilities could not be used to
directly support the foreign branch outside Australia or the obligations of its parent or any
related entity” (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
This restricted access reflected that, “unlike the foreign bank subsidiaries, foreign bank
branches were not separate entities incorporated and independently capitalized in
Australia—they were part of a foreign bank incorporated overseas” (Schwartz 2010).
5. Eligible debt took the form of senior unsecured debt instruments.
Subordinated debt was not eligible for the program.
6. The scheme’s wholesale funding component allowed for the issuance of debt with
maturities of up to five years.
Australian institutions could issue securities with maturities of up to five years (foreign bank
branches were limited to 15 months) that were guaranteed in full by the Australian
government (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013, Schwartz 2010).
This maximum maturity “allowed ADIs more flexibility to lengthen maturities and avoid
bunching of refinancing risk” (Schwartz and Tan 2016). The government did not establish
minimum maturity requirements for eligible debt.
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The Guarantee Scheme employed two different participation processes based on the
maturity of the issued debt. The processes were identical except for differences in the longterm liability process. For a complete breakdown of these differences, refer to the
government guarantee scheme rules in “Implementation Documents” section of the “Key
Documents.”
All currencies were eligible for the scheme’s wholesale funding component.
7. For the most part, there does not appear to have been a cap on any individual
institution’s participation in the scheme’s wholesale funding component.
Foreign branches were limited to 110% of the average daily value of their short-term
liabilities and deposits in the 30 days prior to the Scheme’s announcement
8. A monthly fee was payable to the government based on the credit rating of the
issuer.
All guaranteed liabilities were subject to a monthly fee, which applied to eligible liabilities
issued on or after November 28, 2008. The institution was required to pay this fee within
seven business days of the last calendar day of each month in arrears (Reserve Bank of
Australia 2012, Australian Government 2012). The amount of the fee depended on both the
credit rating of the institution (lower-rated institutions had to pay a higher fee to access the
guarantee) and the value of the guaranteed liabilities. The same fee applied regardless of the
term of the debt (Reserve Bank of Australia 2012).
The fee was calculated by using the following formula10:
Fee payable = Guaranteed liabilities x relevant fee x number of calendar days in month/365.
The relevant fee was prescribed as follows:

Long-Term Credit Rating of ADI

Fee (in basis points per
annum)

AAA to AA-

70

A+ to A–

100

BBB+ and below and Unrated

150

The guarantee fees were designed around multiple variables. These variables included fees
charged by other countries with guarantee schemes, the appropriate pricing of risk, and a
desire for institutions to return to non-guaranteed issuance once conditions improved. The
fees were due monthly rather than up front to avoid putting additional pressure on

_____________________________________________________________________
For short-term liabilities only, the following applied: in calculating the value of these liabilities, the gross
proceeds of the fund raising were to be used (Australian Government 2012).
10
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institutions that were already experiencing liquidity issues (Schwartz 2010; Schwartz and
Tan 2016).
The fees were set between the risk spreads at the time of the Guarantee Scheme’s creation
(a time of extreme market stress) and spreads seen to be likely during normal market
conditions. The fee structure was “designed to act as a natural exit mechanism, so that when
pricing of risk improved, the yield spread between unguaranteed and guaranteed debt would
narrow to below the guarantee fee and it would become cost-effective for issuers to return
to unguaranteed issuance,” thus also reducing the government’s liability (Schwartz 2010;
Schwartz and Tan 2016).
As such, the fee encouraged institutions to buy back their debt. As markets improved, and
the maturity profiles of the remaining guaranteed debt shortened (approximately 12 and 18
months remaining to maturity), the cost of issuing government-guaranteed debt became
more expensive than issuing unguaranteed debt. Thus, institutions began repurchasing their
debt, at first in small amounts, but increasing as conditions improved (Schwartz 2010;
Schwartz and Tan 2016).
9. The Council of Financial Regulators required participants to regularly report their
exposures and activities.
The Council of Financial Regulators, an agency that served in an advisory capacity during the
Guarantee Scheme’s creation and operation, required monitoring of exposures and regular
reports on both individual bank exposures and foreign branch activities. This was a
safeguard (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
10. No deadline for issuing guaranteed debt was established at the outset of the
program, and authorities ultimately closed the issuance window on March 31,
2010.
The government announced that the Guarantee Scheme would remain open until markets
normalized. In making this decision, the government and the Council of Financial Regulators
considered whether to risk premature closure or “the longer-term costs of an extended
period of government support.” Eventually, when the Council of Financial Regulators
recommended the government close the program at the end of March 2010, it was because
market conditions had improved, and the Guarantee Scheme no longer appeared necessary.
The institutions’ use of the Guarantee Scheme “began to appear to be largely a response to
small pricing advantages rather than a reflection of problems of market access” (Schwartz
2010).

III. Evaluation
Reviews of the effectiveness of the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component by
Australian authorities conclude that it was a successful program. Schwartz (2010) at the
Reserve Bank of Australia concluded that it made “a positive and important contribution to
the stability of the Australian financial system by ensuring that institutions continued to have
access to capital markets during the most intense phase of the crisis. It also ensured that the
overall availability of funding was not a material constraint on the capacity of Australian
banks to lend and, for a time, served to mitigate the large increase in the cost of issuing debt.”
According to Schwartz and Tan (2016), there are strong grounds for concluding that the
Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale funding component was successful. It was able to help
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stabilize the Australian financial system and allowed Australian institutions to remain on
equal footing with their international peers who had access to similar schemes. It was heavily
used by both major and non-major institutions and provided large amounts of funding to the
financial sector and thus credit provision to the economy.
Further, Australian central bank officials argue that the Guarantee Scheme’s wholesale
funding component opened and closed at appropriate times, within a defined period of need.
It opened quickly in response to a dire turn in global financial markets, and it closed about
the time other similar international schemes had started to close and the Australian
government believed market conditions had normalized. This “judgment-based closure of
the Guarantee Scheme, as opposed to using a pre-announced closure date, successfully
avoided potential market uncertainty over whether arrangements would be extended in the
lead-up to the pre-announced closure dates” (Schwartz and Tan 2016). As discussed above,
the design of the scheme’s wholesale funding component encouraged institutions to
repurchase their debt as market conditions normalized, and this feature “allowed for a faster
return to standalone market-based funding and reduction in government contingent
liabilities than would otherwise have been the case” (Schwartz 2010; Schwartz and Tan
2016).
No claims were made against the Guarantee Scheme, and it incurred no losses—partly
reflected by the consideration given to risk during the design process. “It was judged
preferable to err on the side of supporting the financial system with simple, easy to
understand arrangements, than to impose greater control over exposures through features
such as limits or institution-specific pricing” (Schwartz and Tan 2016).
At the time of the Guarantee Scheme’s closure, banks had returned to more normal and
stable measures of funding, such as increasing deposit and long-term funding and reducing
the use of short-term wholesale funding. (Schwartz and Tan 2016).

IV.

References

Australian Government. 2012. Australian Government Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits
and
Wholesale
Funding
Rules.
Australia:
Reserve
Bank
of
Australia.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/scheme-rules20042011%20(1).pdf
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. n.d. “About the Financial Claims Scheme.”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/_%20APRA.pdf
Kennedy, Steven. 2009. “Australia’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis.” Speech, June 24,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Australia's%20response%2
0to%20the%20global%20financial%20crisis%20_%20Treasury.gov_.au_.pdf
Reserve Bank of Australia. n.d. “Historical Data: Exchange Rates, Daily, 2007 to 2009.”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Historical%20Data%20_%2
0RBA.pdf
Reserve Bank of Australia. 2012. “Australian Government Guarantee Scheme for Large
Deposits
and
Wholesale
Funding.”

588

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Australian%20Government
%20Guarantee%20Scheme_%20About%20the%20Scheme.pdf
Reserve Bank of Australia. 2013. “Box D: Buybacks of Government Guaranteed Securities.”
Statement
on
Monetary
Policy.
February
2013.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Box%20D_%20Buybacks%
20of%20Government%20Guaranteed%20Securities%20_%20Statement%20on%20Monet
ary%20Policy%20%E2%80%93%20February%202013%20_%20RBA.pdf
Schwartz, Carl. 2010. “The Australian Government Guarantee Scheme.” Reserve Bank of
Australia
Bulletin,
March
2010:
19-26.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Schwartz_Bulletin%20Marc
h%20Quarter%202010.pdf
Schwartz, Carl, and Nicholas Tan. 2016. “The Australian Government Guarantee Scheme:
2008-15.”
Reserve
Bank
of
Australia
Bulletin,
March
2016:
39-46.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/bu-0316-5.pdf

V.

Key Program Documents

Summary of Program
Box A: Government guarantees on deposits and wholesale funding (Financial Stability
Review, March 2009) – Publication by the Reserve Bank of Australia detailing the Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/box-a.pdf
Implementation Documents
Australian Government Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding Rules
– Formal document issued by the Reserve Bank of Australia detailing the scheme’s operation
and
regulation.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/scheme-rules20042011%20(1).pdf
Eligible Institutions – List of eligible institutions included in the formal implementation
document; names all ADIs considered eligible to apply for the Guarantee Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/schedule-1.pdf
Notice of Final Application Date and Final Issuance Date (February 23, 2010) – Formal notice
of the closure of the Guarantee Scheme sent to eligible institutions.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/notice-fad-fid.pdf
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
Financial Claims Scheme – Overview from the Council of Financial Regulators detailing the
Financial Claims Scheme, which was the legal authority under which the Guarantee Scheme
took
place.

589

Australian Government Guarantee Scheme

Smith

https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CFR_%20Financial%20Clai
ms%20Scheme.pdf
Press Releases/Announcements
Global Financial Crisis (October 12, 2008) – Media release of the Prime Minister of Australia’s
public
announcement
of
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Release-Trove.pdf
Government Announces Details of Deposit and Wholesale Funding Guarantees (Wayne
Swan, October 24, 2008) – Media release from the Treasury; an announcement of further
details
of
the
scheme’s
design
and
operational
parameters.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Funding%20Guarantees%2
0_%20Treasury%20Ministers.pdf
Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding of Deposit-Taking Institutions
(Wayne Swan, November 28, 2008) – Media release from the Treasury announcing the
commencement
of
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Press%20Release%20%20Guarantee%20Scheme.pdf
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The Australian Financial System in the 2000s: Dodging the Bullet (Davis 2011) – Reserve
Bank of Australia publication examining the ability of Australia to cope with the global
financial crisis. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/davis.pdf
Reports/Assessments
Reserve Bank of Australia Annual Report 2009 – Annual Report that mentions the setup
required
for
the
Guarantee
Scheme.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-report.pdf
Copyright 2015, 2016, 2020 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this
material or to receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the
Yale Program for Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

591

